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Abstract
Following its landmark decisions in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the
Supreme Court allows federal judges to dismiss cases when the plaintiff’s allegations are
conclusory or implausible, thereby increasing the judges’ discretionary power in pleading
stages of litigation. Using a stylized litigation model, I find the conditions under which
the ruling improves upon litigation outcomes by simultaneously raising deterrence and
reducing litigation costs and error costs. In particular, I demonstrate the ways in which
the ruling’s effect depends on the correlation between the potential injurers’ primary
behavior and the strength of cases filed at trial courts.
Key Words: Twombly ; Iqbal ; deterrence; litigation costs; error costs; perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
JEL: C72; D82; K41.
1 Introduction
Many legal scholars and practitioners have raised concerns about the rapidly rising level of
litigation costs in American lawsuits, especially in terms of the massive expenditures under dis-
covery.1 Recently, the Supreme Court addressed this concern when reviewing an antitrust case
in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly2 in which the Court enhanced federal judges’ gate-keeping
power by allowing them to dismiss cases when the plaintiff’s allegations are “conclusory” or
“implausible,” thereby establishing a “plausibility” standard for motions to dismiss. In its
∗School of Economics, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea (chulyoung.kim@gmail.com).
1There seems to be general consensus that discovery has become unnecessarily expensive. For example,
a recent survey of attorneys in the American Bar Association Section of Litigation reported that 82 percent
of the respondents agreed that discovery was too expensive (American Bar Association Section of Litigation
Member Survey on Civil Practice: Full Report, December 2009, Tables 6.1 and 11.5). This survey also reported
that three-quarters of respondents agreed that discovery costs, as a share of total litigation costs, had increased
disproportionately due to the advent of e-discovery (Table 7.4).
2550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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later decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,3 which is often referenced with the preceding opinion as
“Twiqbal,” the Court confirmed that this new law applies to all federal cases.4 This decision
marked a clear departure from the previous legal regime, Conley v. Gibson,5 in which the
power of federal judges in granting motions to dismiss was quite limited.6 These landmark
decisions led legal scholars to produce voluminous literature expressing support for the de-
cisions and concerns about the prospect of greatly changing federal litigation in important
areas of law.7
Although the Court admitted that the ruling was expected to increase error costs because
the enhanced role of federal judges in screening cases would keep some meritorious cases from
reaching trial, it reasoned that a higher level of error costs could be justified by the avoidance
of higher litigation costs. This decision consequently requires federal judges to engage in
a cost-benefit analysis and to dismiss cases when gains from avoiding litigation costs loom
larger than losses from incurring error costs. Empirical research has presented a somewhat
mixed picture of the aftermath of Twiqbal : while Cecil et al. (2011a,b), Curry and Ward
(2013), and Hubbard (2013, 2016) suggest that the ruling produced no measurable effect on
litigation outcomes, Eisenberg and Clermont (2014), Gelbach (2012), and Reinert (2015) hold
the opposite view.
While Twiqbal has stimulated research attention and led many scholars to investigate
its effects on litigation outcomes, as pointed out by Klerman (2015), the ruling’s effect on a
potential injurer’s ex ante behavior has rarely been studied. To the best of my knowledge, this
topic is explored only by Kaplow (2013) and Campos et al. (2015). Kaplow (2013) develops
inspiring intuitions about the ways in which each decision-making stage should be structured
in multistage adjudication. He studies Twiqbal ’s effects on the deterrence of harmful acts but
does not employ a formal model. Most closely related to the present study is that by Campos
et al. (2015). Within a formal game-theoretic model, they show that potential injurers,
anticipating that a large number of meritorious cases will be dismissed at pleading stages,
may make less effort to comply with the law after Twiqbal. This lower level of deterrence is
shown to operate to increase litigation costs and error costs in their model.
3556 U.S. 662 (2009).
4Kaplow (2013) notes that “[t]hese two decisions are viewed as among the more important of the Roberts
Court” (p. 1181). These decisions generated intense reactions, including proposals for congressional override.
See, e.g., Bone (2010) who notes proposals of the Notice Pleading Restoration Act, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009)
and the Open Access to Courts Act, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009).
5355 U.S. 41 (1957).
6Until 2007, the federal courts were supposed to allow notice pleading. Under notice pleading, it was
enough for the plaintiff to “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests” (Conley v. Gibson 1957, p. 47) to survive a motion to dismiss, and judges were not supposed
to dismiss the case “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief” (Conley v. Gibson 1957, pp. 45-46). Thus, judges typically granted
motions to dismiss only when the plaintiff’s complaint was based on an erroneous interpretation of law.
7While some scholars such as Anderson and Huffman (2010) express support for the ruling, others, including
Dodson (2013), Gelbach (2012), Miller (2010), and Spencer (2013), raise concerns.
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I present a complementary view on the ruling’s effect on deterrence and other litigation
outcomes by demonstrating that Twiqbal simultaneously raises deterrence and reduces litiga-
tion costs and error costs under certain conditions. In particular, I demonstrate the ways in
which the ruling’s effect depends on the degree of correlation between the potential injurers’
primary behavior and the strength of cases filed at trial courts. Furthermore, I show that
Twiqbal could generate desirable changes in those tort cases in which this correlation is strong.
I obtain a result contrary to Campos et al. (2015) under certain conditions, because the
potential injurer in my model faces different dismissal rates depending on his choice of act
under Twiqbal. More precisely, in my model, a case is filed against the injurer when an
accident occurs, and the judge decides whether to dismiss the case after taking into account
the strength of the claim against the injurer. Under suitable assumptions about the correlation
between the injurer’s act and the strength of the complaint, the judge is more likely to dismiss
cases involving non-negligent injurers than those involving negligent ones, which could provide
the potential injurer with higher incentive to comply with the law after Twiqbal.
It is interesting to find that the ruling can reduce error costs, in contrast to the concern
expressed by the Supreme Court as well as the opponents of the ruling. I obtain this result be-
cause, as previously mentioned, Twiqbal raises the level of deterrence under certain conditions,
which in turn reduces the instances of the court’s mistakes in assigning liability because the
cases involving non-negligent injurers induce fewer mistakes. This asymmetry arises from the
fact that the dismissal of a case is equivalent to assigning no liability on the injurer, thereby
generating no error costs if a non-negligent injurer’s case is dismissed in the pleading stage of
litigation. Therefore, a higher level of deterrence under Twiqbal operates to reduce error costs
by raising the proportion of non-negligent injurers in the population. It is also interesting to
find that the ruling can simultaneously raise deterrence and reduce litigation costs, because it
is often believed that deterrence increases in the face of threat of high litigation costs under
negligent acts. The intuition behind my result rests on the interplay between deterrence and
litigation costs: higher litigation costs increase deterrence, but higher deterrence in turn may
operate to reduce the amount of expected litigation costs by lowering the number of cases
proceeding to trial. Thus, in all these results, I show how the change in the level of deterrence
plays a key role in assessing Twiqbal ’s effects on important litigation outcomes.
In general, Posner (1973) argues that the pleading stage in litigation is beneficial for society
because it reduces litigation costs by keeping low-merit cases from proceeding to trial. For
other related theoretical work, see Hylton (2008), Issacharoff and Miller (2013), and Reilly
(2015). For empirical work on motions to dismiss, see Klerman (2015) for an excellent survey
on this topic. For extensive surveys on the economics of procedural law, see Bone (2003) and
Sanchirico (2012).
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model
studied in this paper. In particular, I define two different games, one describing the Conley
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regime and the other describing the Twiqbal regime. Section 3 derives an equilibrium from
each game and investigates the effects of Twiqbal on deterrence, litigation costs, and error
costs. Section 4 concludes with a discussion. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 Model
This section develops a stylized model to investigate the ways in which a judge’s gate-keeping
power influences an injurer’s precautionary behavior. Formally, I develop a dynamic game of
incomplete information with two stages, the Precaution Stage and the Pleading Stage, and
two players, the injurer and the judge.
Before proceeding to the details of the basic model, it is instructive to elaborate on the
judge’s gate-keeping power and her preference. In Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, the Supreme Court gave federal judges the power to dismiss cases when the plaintiff’s
allegations are conclusory or implausible. Although the Court admitted that the judge’s
enhanced gate-keeping power could result in the dismissal of some meritorious cases, which
could lead to higher error costs, it reasoned that the avoidance of high litigation costs justifies
the possible increase in error costs.
To investigate the effect of the Court’s decision on the injurer’s precautionary behavior, I
compare equilibrium outcomes from two different games in terms of the judge’s discretionary
power in her dismissal decision:
1. Game-C: the judge is required to send every case to trial
2. Game-T: the judge has discretion to dismiss cases
Game-C describes the Conley regime in which the judge plays a limited role in dismissing
cases, and Game-T portrays the Twiqbal regime with the judge’s enhanced discretionary power
in deciding whether a case is worth a trial.
In Game-C, the judge has no other option than choosing to send cases to trial. In contrast,
in Game-T, the judge is required by the Court’s ruling to engage in the cost-benefit analysis
and to dismiss cases if litigation costs loom larger than error costs and vice versa. To model
this behavior, I assume that the judge in my model considers two types of costs in her dismissal
decision: litigation costs and error costs. Litigation costs are the costs expensed at trial, such
as attorney fees and court administration expenses. Error costs are the costs arising from
inaccurate decisions. For example, if an injurer who incurred a certain amount of loss on a
third party is mistakenly exonerated, we can imagine that the error costs are proportional to
the uncompensated loss suffered by the third party.
If a case moves to trial, it incurs both litigation costs and error costs. Note that error
costs may arise at trial because a jury may erroneously find a non-negligent injurer liable and
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vice versa. In contrast, if a case is dismissed before reaching trial, it could generate error costs
but no litigation costs. Therefore, if the judge has discretion to dismiss a case, she compares
the litigation costs and error costs of the case at hand, and dismisses a case if the total cost
from trial is larger than the error costs from dismissal.
To be more precise, I denote by δ the measure of error costs, and by c the litigation costs
at trial. Thus, if a case moves to trial, the judge’s payoff is given by
piJ = −θδtrial − c
where θ is the relative importance of error costs to litigation costs. In contrast, if a case is
dismissed before reaching trial, the judge’s payoff is given by
piJ = −θδdismiss
because litigation costs are not expensed. Note that the error costs at trial could be different
from the error costs from dismissal. This point will be clarified below.
Formally, I lay out the details of the basic model as follows. In the first stage, Precaution
Stage, the injurer chooses his act, a ∈ {0, 1}, where a = 0 stands for a non-negligent act and
a = 1 a negligent act. The negligent act generates a private benefit b ∈ [0, b¯] to the injurer
according to the distribution function F (b), but causes an accident to a third party. If the
injurer chooses the non-negligent act, he obtains no benefit from his act but he can reduce
the likelihood of an accident: an accident to a third party occurs with probability q ∈ (0, 1)
under a = 0. In case of an accident, a third party suffers a loss of L > 0. If no accident
occurs, the game ends, and both the injurer and the judge obtain a payoff of 0, piI = 0 and
piJ = 0, respectively. If an accident occurs, the injurer is brought to the court, and the game
proceeds to the next stage.
In the second stage, Pleading Stage, a complaint is filed against the injurer, and the judge
observes the strength of the case, which is summarized by x ∈ R. For instance, from a sparse
complaint, the judge could infer that the victim lacked favorable facts and could conclude
that the case was exceedingly weak. Presumably, the strength of the case at hand could be
primarily influenced by the injurer’s act, and thus I assume that x is realized according to the
conditional distribution function G(x|a) with the conditional density function g(x|a),8 which
satisfies the following monotonicity properties:
Assumption 1. φ(x) < φ(x′) for x < x′ where
φ(x) =
g(x|1)
g(x|0)
8For simplicity, I assume that the occurrence of an accident and the realization of x are independent
conditional on a.
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Assumption 2. limx→−∞ φ(x) = 0 and limx→∞ φ(x) =∞
Assumption 1 requires that the distribution satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property.
This property guarantees a positive association between x and a: a higher value of x is
associated with a higher value of a, and vice versa. Intuitively, one can expect the case to
be strongly against the negligent injurer because a strong complaint can be filed against him
based on unfavorable initial evidence. Assumption 2, as shown in the analysis, guarantees an
interior solution.
After observing x, depending on whether the game is Game-C or Game-T, the judge could
exercise discretion in choosing whether to send the case to trial or dismiss the case. Although
an ideal system may reveal the truth perfectly at trial, actual legal procedures are sometimes
far from the ideal because the fact-finder must make a decision in the face of uncertainty. If
the degree of uncertainty is large, the final verdict from the trier of fact may deviate from the
truth, harming blameless parties and providing people with poor guidance for their primary
behavior. This problem is especially pronounced in the case of jury trials in which laypeople
participate in deciding the facts of the case.9
Accordingly, let d denote the jury’s decision regarding the injurer’s act and e denote the
probability of errors at trial such that
P (d = 1|a = 0) = P (d = 0|a = 1) ≡ e ∈ (0, 1/2).
Thus, the jury at trial may erroneously find that the non-negligent injurer was negligent (i.e.,
d = 1 when a = 0) and vice versa.
To determine the trial payoffs of the players, I assume that δ takes the following expression:
δ = |aL− t| (1)
where aL is the lawful amount of compensation required to be made to the third party, and t
is the actual amount of compensation made to the third party. Thus, the expression (1) means
that error costs are proportional to the difference between the lawful and the actual amount
of compensation, with a positive level of error costs unless these two amounts of compensation
are the same.
In Game-C, the judge is required to send every case to trial. Thus, if an accident occurs,
9See, e.g., Kalven and Zeisel (1966) and Simon (1975) for the controversy over the merits of using lay juries.
In Skidmore v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 116 F.2d 54 (1947), Judge Jerome Frank wrote: “While the jury
can contribute nothing of value so far as the law is concerned, it has infinite capacity for mischief, for twelve
men can easily misunderstand more law in a minute than the judge can explain in an hour.” Dean Griswold
of Harvard Law School argued (Guinther, 1988): “The jury trial at best is the apotheosis of the amateur.
Why should anyone think that 12 persons brought in from the street, selected in various ways, for their lack
of general ability, should have any special capacity for deciding controversies between persons?”
6
I 
J 
0a 1a
N 
x
N 
0
0


J
I


accident 
no accident 
cLad
cdL
J
II


||

0
0


J
I


trial dismiss 
N 
x
N 
accident 
cLad
cdLb
J
II


||

L
b
J
I




trial dismiss 
Precaution  
Stage 
Pleading 
Stage 
Figure 1: Game Tree for Game-T
a trial ensues, and the injurer and the judge obtain the following payoffs:
piI = ba− dL− cI (2)
piJ = −θδ − c = −θ|d− a|L− c
where cI is the injurer’s expenses at trial such as attorney fees. As litigation costs at trial are
inclusive of the injurer’s expenses, it seems reasonable to assume c ≥ cI . The expression for
piI is straightforward: the injurer obtains b under a = 1, is required to make compensations
L under d = 1, and incurs litigation costs cI . To understand the expression for piJ , observe
that there are four possibilities at trial: (d, a) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}. Under the first
and fourth possibilities, (d, a) ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 1)}, there are no error costs because
δ = |aL− t| =
{
|0 · L− 0| = 0
|1 · L− L| = 0
In contrast, under the second and third possibilities, (d, a) ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0)}, there are positive
error costs because
δ = |aL− t| =
{
|1 · L− 0| = L
|0 · L− L| = L
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which explains the expression for piJ .
In Game-T, the judge has discretion to dismiss the case by comparing its litigation costs
and error costs. If the judge sends the case to trial, payoffs are realized as in (2). If the judge
dismisses the case, there are only error costs from the case and the payoffs are realized as
follows:
piI = ab
piJ = −θδ = −θaL.
In this situation, no litigation costs are incurred because a costly trial is avoided. Thus, the
injurer’s payoff is either b under a = 1 or 0 under a = 0. As the injurer is required to make
no compensation due to the dismissal, the error costs are given by
δ = |aL− t| = aL
which explains the expression for piJ .
Note that it is possible that the judge never sends a case to trial in Game-T if θ is close
to 0 because litigation costs become the dominant factor in the judge’s decision regardless of
error costs. Then, there is no trial, and therefore litigation costs drop to 0 and the injurer is
not deterred at all in Game-T. To rule out this extreme possibility and focus on more realistic
situations, I assume that if the judge believes that the injurer was negligent (a = 1) for sure,
the error costs from dismissal are higher than the total cost from trial, inducing the judge to
send such a case to trial. In other words, θ cannot be too small:
Assumption 3. c(1−e)L < θ
One of the main purposes of this paper is to compare the levels of deterrence between the
Conley and Twiqbal regimes. For this purpose, it is convenient to have an “interior” level of
deterrence under the Conley regime because this will help clarify the effect Twiqbal has on
deterrence.10 The following assumption on b¯ will be used to this end, which guarantees that
the maximum benefit is sufficiently high so that some injurers are never deterred:
Assumption 4. (1− (1 + q)e)L+ (1− q)cI < b¯
Assumptions 1-4 are maintained throughout the paper without further mention. In the
next section, I analyze the model and compare the equilibrium outcomes from Game-C and
Game-T. As the model is a dynamic game of incomplete information, the appropriate solu-
tion concept is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which is simply referred to as equilibrium
throughout this paper.
10Otherwise, the deterrence could be maximal or minimal under both regimes, which renders the comparison
ambiguous.
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3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Conley Regime
In Game-C, the judge is constrained to send every case to trial in her information set. An-
ticipating the judge’s decision, the injurer knows that the non-negligent act will generate the
expected payoff of
EpiI = −q(eL+ cI)
because an accident still occurs with probability q, in which case he will be brought all the
way to trial with expected compensation eL and litigation costs cI . Note that due to court
errors, even the non-negligent injurer expects to fully compensate the victim with a positive
probability. Similarly, the negligent act will provide the injurer with the expected payoff of
EpiI = b− (1− e)L− cI .
Although he obtains a private benefit b, he expects an accident, and consequently a trial, to
occur for sure with expected compensation (1− e)L and litigation costs cI . Because of court
errors, the negligent injurer is held liable only with probability 1 − e, with lower expected
liability if the jury makes mistakes more frequently at trial. Thus, the injurer chooses a = 1
if and only if
DC ≡ (1− (1 + q)e)L+ (1− q)cI < b (3)
where DC represents the level of deterrence in Game-C. Because I have DC > 0, “low type”
injurers with b ∈ [0, DC ] are induced to choose the non-negligent act, and therefore the fraction
of non-negligent injurers is positive: F (DC) > 0. In addition, according to Assumption 4, the
injurer with the maximum benefit (b = b¯) will choose a = 1. Thus, by continuity, “high type”
injurers with b ∈ (DC , b¯] are not deterred, inducing F (DC) < 1. Together, these observations
show that the level of deterrence in Game-C is in the interior: DC ∈ (0, b¯) and F (DC) ∈ (0, 1).
Note that a higher level of deterrence is socially desirable under the Conley regime. To see
this, observe that the social cost of the negligent act is L+ c because it incurs an accident for
sure, with an accident cost L and consequent litigation costs c. Also observe that the social
cost of the non-negligent act is q(L + c) because an accident occurs only with probability q.
Thus, the net social gain from the non-negligent act is (1− q)(L+ c), and therefore a higher
level of deterrence is preferred for society. 11
11This is a typical feature in models analyzed in the law and economics literature. For example, see De-
mougin and Fluet (2006, 2008). Recently, Kaplow (2011) criticizes these modeling approaches, and introduces
chilling effects in addition to deterrence effects.
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From (3), it is straightforward to verify the effect of changes in litigation environment on
deterrence as follows:
∂DC
∂e < 0,
∂DC
∂L > 0,
∂DC
∂cI
> 0, ∂DC∂q < 0. (4)
The signs of these derivatives are intuitive. First, as expected, higher court errors reduce de-
terrence: the possibilities that negligent injurers can avoid liability and non-negligent injurers
can be held liable reduce the net benefit of choosing the non-negligent act. Thus, under the
Conley regime, it is expected that court errors are inversely related to deterrence.12 Second, a
higher level of accident loss has a larger effect on negligent injurers because they have a higher
chance of paying the compensation. Thus, the level of deterrence increases as the amount of
accident loss increases. A similar reasoning applies to the effect of a higher level of litigation
costs. Finally, if the non-negligent act is more likely to generate an accident, the level of
deterrence decreases because it reduces the net benefit of the non-negligent act.
The other two important litigation outcomes, expected litigation costs (denoted by ELC)
and expected error costs (denoted by EEC), can be readily calculated as follows:13
ELCC = P (trial)c (5)
EECC = P (trial)eL (6)
where P (trial) = F (DC)q + 1− F (DC) is the probability that a trial occurs. Litigation costs
are only expensed at trial, which generates the expression (5). To understand (6), first note
that if a case proceeds to trial, it is expected to generate error costs of eL. If a trial does not
occur, it turns out that there are no error costs because a trial does not occur only when the
injurer is non-negligent.
Using the results from (4), we can see how these litigation outcomes respond to the changes
in the litigation environment:
dELCC
de > 0,
dELCC
dL < 0,
dELCC
dcI
≷ 0, dELCCdq > 0,
dEECC
de > 0,
dEECC
dL ≷ 0,
dEECC
dcI
< 0, dEECCdq > 0
(7)
where total derivatives are calculated to capture the indirect effect of parameter changes
through deterrence. First, higher court errors unambiguously increase both ELCC and EECC
by reducing deterrence and increasing P (trial). In particular, the direct and indirect effects
12This is a standard result in the model of law enforcement. For example, see Kaplow and Shavell (1994).
13Legal scholars have long considered these two litigation outcomes as the two most important ones. Posner
argues that accuracy and cost are the two most important criteria in comparing legal systems (Posner, 1999,
p.1542). Kaplow (1994) also notes that “[one] might go so far as to say that a large portion of the rules of
civil, criminal, and administrative procedure and rules of evidence involve an effort to strike a balance between
accuracy and legal costs.”
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of higher e coincide in increasing EECC : as the jury makes more mistakes in assigning the
liability, it directly raises the error costs from trial; in addition, higher court errors reduce
deterrence, thereby increasing P (trial) and consequently the error costs. Thus, this result,
together with the effect of court errors on deterrence, shows that court errors are detrimental
in three important measures of legal outcomes. In contrast, it will be shown later that this
intuitive result under Conley may not hold under Twiqbal.
Second, a higher level of accident loss reduces ELCC by reducing P (trial) through higher
deterrence, but its effect on EECC is ambiguous because higher L also directly raises EECC .
The effect of higher litigation costs can be similarly understood. It is interesting to observe
that a higher value of cI could reduce the expected litigation costs. This seemingly counter-
intuitive result arises in my model because the change in litigation costs could influence an
individual’s behavior; if this effect on behavior is sufficiently strong, the increase in litigation
costs could benefit society by reducing the expected amount of litigation expenses. Finally,
if the non-negligent act generates an accident more often, it is detrimental in terms of both
ELCC and EECC by raising P (trial) through lower deterrence.
3.2 Twiqbal Regime
To find the equilibrium of Game-T, I first consider the judge’s behavior in Pleading Stage.
When this stage of the game is reached, the judge knows that an accident occurred and
observes the strength of the claim against the injurer. With this information and her belief
about the level of deterrence,14 the judge dismisses a case if and only if the expected error
costs from dismissing the case are less than the total cost from trial:
E[θδ|x, accident] ≤ c+ θeL. (8)
If the judge dismisses the case, she expects to incur error costs given on the left-hand side of
(8), which is the expectation of θδ conditional on the judge’s information. If the case proceeds
to trial, litigation costs, c, will be incurred and the jury decision is expected to generate error
costs of eL, which are given on the right-hand side of (8). The following lemma demonstrates
that the judge uses a cutoff strategy, where the cutoff depends on the litigation environment.15
Lemma 1. Given the judge’s belief about the level of deterrence, there exists a unique cutoff
x¯ such that the judge dismisses a case if and only if x ≤ x¯ where |x¯| < ∞. Moreover, x¯ is
strictly increasing in e, c, and q, and strictly decreasing in θ and L.
14As the judge cannot observe the injurer’s action directly, she must form a belief about the level of
deterrence. This belief must be eventually consistent with the injurer’s strategy in equilibrium, which is shown
in Proposition 1.
15In the following analysis, I assume that the judge’s belief about the level of deterrence is non-degenerate,
i.e., the judge believes that deterrence is in the interior. This is because degenerate beliefs held by the judge
cannot constitute an equilibrium. See Appendix 5.1 for details.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
If the strength of the claim is weak, the judge believes that the injurer was non-negligent
with a high probability. This belief in turn reduces the expected error costs from dismissal
because dismissing a case is equivalent to imposing no liability on the injurer. As the case
strength becomes stronger, it is more likely that the injurer acted negligently, increasing the
expected error costs from dismissal and thereby inducing the judge to send the case to trial.
This argument shows that one can find a cutoff x¯ such that the judge dismisses a case if and
only if the strength of the case is less than the cutoff value.
Lemma 1 also demonstrates how the judge’s cutoff decision-rule responds to the changes
in the litigation environment. Intuitively, the rise in e, c, or q induces the judge to dismiss
stronger cases because it raises the cost of using a trial. If court errors or litigation costs
increase, they directly reduce the value of using a trial. If q increases, the non-negligent
act generates an accident with a higher probability than before, and therefore the portion of
non-negligent injurers in the pool of injurers brought to the court increases, thereby reducing
the value of using a trial. The opposite effects arise when θ or L increases, which induces the
judge to care more about error costs, thereby inducing the judge to send weaker cases to trial.
Using backward induction, in Precaution Stage, anticipating the judge’s behavior, the
injurer believes that his expected payoffs are given by
a = 0⇒ EpiI = −q (1−G(x¯|0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗)
(cI + eL)
a = 1⇒ EpiI = b− (1−G(x¯|1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗∗)
(cI + (1− e)L)
where (∗) and (∗∗) are the probabilities that a trial ensues under each act. For instance, (∗)
is the probability that the strength of the case filed against the non-negligent injurer exceeds
the threshold x¯. As the judge sends such a case to trial, the injurer anticipates that a trial
occurs with probability (∗) when brought to the court under a = 0. The other part, (∗∗), can
be similarly understood. Thus, the injurer chooses a = 1 if and only if
DT ≡ (1−G(x¯|1))(cI + (1− e)L)− q(1−G(x¯|0))(cI + eL) < b
where DT represents the level of deterrence in Game-T. In equilibrium, the judge’s belief must
be consistent with the injurer’s strategy, which is dealt with in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. There exists an equilibrium (D∗T , x¯
∗) in Game-T such that (i) the injurer
chooses a = 1 if and only if D∗T < b and (ii) the judge dismisses a case if and only if x ≤ x¯∗,
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where |x¯∗| <∞ and
D∗T = (1−G(x¯∗|1))(cI + (1− e)L)− q(1−G(x¯∗|0))(cI + eL) ∈ (0, b¯).
Proof. See the Appendix.
As under Conley, a higher level of deterrence is also preferred under Twiqbal. To see this,
observe that the negligent act generates the social cost of L+ (1−G(x¯∗|1))c because it incurs
the accident loss L for sure, sometimes followed by a trial with the litigation cost c. Similarly,
the social cost under the non-negligent act is q(L+(1−G(x¯∗|0))c), which can be easily shown
to be smaller than the social cost under the negligent act. Thus, the net social gain from the
non-negligent act is positive, and therefore a higher level of deterrence is beneficial for society.
While the effect of changes in the litigation environment on deterrence is unambiguous
in Game-C as shown in (4), this is not true in case of Game-T because the effect crucially
depends on the shape of the distribution G(x|a). To see this point clearly, taking the partial
derivative of D∗T with respect to e, I obtain
∂D∗T
∂e
= (qg(x¯∗|0)(cI + eL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
− g(x¯∗|1)(cI + (1− e)L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
) · ∂x¯
∗
∂e
− (1−G(x¯∗|1) + q(1−G(x¯∗|0)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c)
·L
where the first line captures the indirect effect of higher court errors through a higher cutoff,
and the second line exhibits its direct effect. As can be easily seen, the direct effect reduces
the net benefit of the non-negligent act because negligent injurers expect to pay less and non-
negligent injurers expect to pay more due to higher court errors. Thus, deterrence falls due to
the direct effect. In contrast, the indirect effect is ambiguous and it depends on the number
of marginal injurers who can avoid trial under each act. On the one hand, g(x¯∗|0) from (a)
indicates the number of marginal non-negligent injurers who can avoid trial due to the higher
cutoff. Thus, if this value is large, it raises the benefit of the non-negligent act, thereby raising
deterrence. On the other hand, g(x¯∗|1) from (b) indicates the number of marginal negligent
injurers who can avoid trial due to the higher cutoff. Consequently, if this value is large, it
raises the benefit of the negligent act, thereby reducing deterrence. Therefore, the indirect
effect on deterrence is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of these two forces,
which renders the sign of the total effect undetermined.16
16This finding leads us to the important empirical question of estimating the number of individuals whose
decisions could be affected by the changes in litigation environment. A similar observation is made by Kaplow
(2013): “... there is the further empirical question ... of how many individuals with the opportunity to commit
a harmful act have a private benefit in the range of 50 to 60” (p. 1197).
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The equilibrium expected litigation and error costs are, respectively, given by
ELCT = P (trial)c (9)
EECT = P (trial)eL+ (1− F (D∗T ))G(x¯∗|1)L (10)
where P (trial) = F (D∗T )q(1 − G(x¯∗|0)) + (1 − F (D∗T ))(1 − G(x¯∗|1)). The expression (9) is
straightforward because litigation costs are expensed only at trial. As for (10), if a case
proceeds to trial, it is expected to generate error costs of eL. In addition, a portion of
dismissed cases involves negligent injurers who avoid a costly trial with the help of weak
claims against them. These cases inflict error costs L, which is captured by the second term
in (10).
Observe that the effect of changes in litigation environment on these litigation outcomes is
also ambiguous because the indirect effect through deterrence is itself ambiguous as discussed
above. As ELCT and EECT crucially depend on the level of deterrence, it is important
to assess the ways in which the injurer responds to the changes in litigation environment.
Despite its importance, however, according to Klerman (2015), empirical research has mainly
focused on direct costs such as litigation costs although there has been extensive research
on the motion to dismiss. My results suggest that to accurately assess the effects of policy
changes under Twiqbal, we need more research on the ruling’s effects on deterrence, and the
mechanism behind the ways in which deterrence may influence important litigation outcomes.
3.3 Effects of Twiqbal on Litigation Outcomes
In this subsection, I compare the equilibrium outcomes across the two legal regimes, and
discuss the ways in which the Supreme Court’s decision may influence litigation outcomes.
In particular, I study the decision’s effect on three important variables: deterrence, expected
litigation costs, and expected error costs.
Deterrence
First, I study how the judge’s enhanced gate-keeping power may influence the level of de-
terrence. In particular, I find the conditions under which Twiqbal may or may not induce a
higher level of deterrence. To this end, subtracting DC from D
∗
T , I obtain
D∗T −DC = (1−G(x¯∗|1))(cI + (1− e)L)− q(1−G(x¯∗|0))(cI + eL)
−(1− (1 + q)e)L− (1− q)cI
= −G(x¯∗|1)(cI + (1− e)L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+ qG(x¯∗|0)(cI + eL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
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where (A) indicates the detrimental effect of Twiqbal on deterrence and (B) the beneficial
effect. As the judge dismisses weak cases using her gate-keeping power, injurers who had to
face costly trials under Conley can now avoid them if the claims against them are weak. This
possibility reduces the costs of both negligent and non-negligent acts, which are captured
by (A) and (B). Therefore, deterrence increases under Twiqbal if and only if the following
condition holds:
G(x¯∗|1)
G(x¯∗|0) <
q(cI + eL)
cI + (1− e)L (11)
where the right-hand side is less than 1.
Proposition 2. If the dismissal ratio is sufficiently small, deterrence increases after Twiqbal.
The left-hand side of (11) is the ratio between the dismissal rates of each type of injurers,
which is strictly less than 1 due to Assumption 1. The condition (11) imposes a constraint on
this ratio for Twiqbal to generate a higher level of deterrence, requiring this dismissal ratio
to be sufficiently small. If the case strength has a strong correlation with the injurer’s act,
the dismissal ratio is likely to be small, satisfying the constraint above. Thus, in contrast
to Campos et al. (2015), my model suggests a possibility that the Supreme Court’s decisions
raise deterrence.
Presumably, the degree of correlation between the case strength and the injurer’s primary
act could vary across different types of torts. In case of financial lawsuits, the correlation
could be relatively high because of the wide availability of transaction data and the active
monitoring activities of market participants. In contrast, the correlation could be relatively
low in civil rights cases, because the plaintiff often lacks direct evidence of the defendant’s
motives at the outset of litigation;17 moreover, courts often hold that police officers may use
race and other characteristics in determining the likelihood that a person has engaged in a
crime, as long as this use is reasonably related to law enforcement and is not a pretext for
racial harassment.18 Thus, if this were the case, one could argue that (11) is more likely to
hold in financial lawsuits, with an implication that Twiqbal could reduce financial frauds (i.e.,
more deterrence in financial cases) but raise the instances of discriminatory activities (i.e.,
less deterrence in civil rights cases).
These different changes in deterrence could explain to a certain extent the mixed picture
described by empirical research about Twiqbal ’s effect on litigation outcomes. If the level
of deterrence increases in financial cases as suggested above, the average case filed at trial
courts becomes weaker as the proportion of non-negligent injurers in the population increases,
17Kilaru (2010) argues that “civil rights plaintiffs ... cannot state a claim because they do not have access to
documents or witnesses they believe exist; and they cannot get access to those documents or witnesses without
stating a claim.”
18For instance, see Thompson (1999) for an analysis of this issue. See also Persico (2002) for the concept of
statistical discrimination in law enforcement.
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which results in the judge granting motions to dismiss more often.19 Following a similar logic,
one obtains the opposite result in civil rights cases, resulting in different rates of motions to
dismiss granted by federal judges, which could contribute to mixed empirical findings.
In addition, as the direction of effect could be different across different types of torts, one
needs to interpret empirical findings with caution. In particular, the ruling’s positive effect
on deterrence in a certain type of tort could provide poor guidance to researchers about the
direction of effect in other types of torts. This could potentially pose a challenge to empirical
research in estimating the ruling’s effect on deterrence.
Expected Litigation Costs
The expected litigation costs from (5) and (9) are reproduced here:
Game-C : (F (DC)q + 1− F (DC))c
Game-T : (F (D∗T )q(1−G(x¯∗|0)) + (1− F (D∗T ))(1−G(x¯∗|1)))c.
If (11) holds, it is straightforward to show that the following inequalities hold:
(F (DC)q + 1− F (DC))c
> (F (DC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
q(1−G(x¯∗|0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
+ (1− F (DC))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c)
(1−G(x¯∗|1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(d)
)c
> (F (D∗T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a′)
q(1−G(x¯∗|0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
+ (1− F (D∗T ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c′)
(1−G(x¯∗|1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(d)
)c
The first inequality is true because of multiplication of fractions (b) and (d). To see why the
second inequality is true, observe that (b) < (d) because G(x¯∗|0) > G(x¯∗|1), which follows
from Assumption 1. Then, assuming (11), the second inequality is true because the average
is taken with a larger weight on (b) than on (d), i.e., (a) < (a′) and (c) > (c′). Thus, if the
level of deterrence rises under Twiqbal, it operates to reduce the expected litigation costs by
reducing the number of cases proceeding to trial.
Proposition 3. If the dismissal ratio is sufficiently small, expected litigation costs decrease
after Twiqbal.
Although the avoidance of high litigation costs is the reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s
decision, the judge’s enhanced role in screening cases itself cannot guarantee this result because
19A Federal Judicial Center study found that motions to dismiss were filed in a greater percentage of
cases after the Supreme Court’s decision (4.0% in 2005-2006 versus 6.2% in 2009-2010 according to Cecil et al.
(2011a)), but its influence had been quite different across different types of torts. In particular, the increase was
smallest in civil rights cases although Ashcroft v. Iqbal involved a dispute regarding discriminatory activities.
Furthermore, although the overall percentage of motions to dismiss granted went up from 66% to 75%, the
effect was statistically significant only for financial lawsuits.
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the level of deterrence could fall under Twiqbal (i.e., when (11) is not satisfied), thereby raising
the expected litigation costs. Thus, again, the study of the effect on deterrence is important
for researchers to assess the ruling’s effect on litigation costs.
Expected Error Costs
The expected error costs from (6) and (10) under each regime can be rearranged as follows:
Game-C : F (DC) qeL︸︷︷︸
(a)
+(1− F (DC)) eL︸︷︷︸
(b)
Game-T : F (D∗T ) q(1−G(x¯∗|0))eL︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a′)
+(1− F (D∗T )) {G(x¯∗|1)L+ (1−G(x¯∗|1))eL}︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b′)
Investigation of these expressions reveals that the total effect of Twiqbal on the expected
error costs consists of two effects: the dismissal effect and the deterrence effect. First, I
consider the dismissal effect, where I fix the level of deterrence across the two legal regimes
(i.e., DC = D
∗
T ) and investigate Twiqbal ’s direct effect on error costs. On one hand, observe
that the negligent act generates higher error costs than the non-negligent act under both
regimes: (a) < (b) and (a′) < (b′). The reasons are that (i) a trial occurs less frequently under
the non-negligent act, (ii) dismissing negligent injurers generates error costs while dismissing
non-negligent injurers does not, and (iii) non-negligent injurers’ cases are more likely to be
dismissed.20 On the other hand, Twiqbal reduces the error costs resulting from the non-
negligent act but raises those resulting from the negligent act: (a′) < (a) and (b) < (b′). The
first inequality holds because the dismissal of non-negligent injurers’ cases incurs no error
costs, and the second inequality holds because (i) the expected error costs from trial are
the same across the two legal regimes (i.e., eL) and (ii) the dismissal of negligent injurers’
cases after Twiqbal incurs higher error costs (i.e., L) than the trial does (i.e., eL). These
two factors suggest that, when the level of deterrence across the two legal regimes is fixed,
Twiqbal ’s effect on error costs becomes ambiguous and depends on the dismissal rates of the
two types of injurers. If the judge dismisses non-negligent injurers’ cases sufficiently more
often (i.e., G(x¯∗|0)  G(x¯∗|1)), I could obtain (a′)  (a) and (b) ≈ (b′), thereby obtaining
smaller expected error costs under Twiqbal and vice versa.
Second, I consider the deterrence effect, where I look at Twiqbal ’s indirect effect on error
costs via deterrence. If condition (11) is satisfied, the enhanced deterrence under Twiqbal
operates to reduce expected error costs. This can be seen by observing that EECT is an
average of (a′) and (b′) with a weight to (a′) given by F (D∗T ). Thus, if the level of deterrence
becomes higher under Twiqbal (i.e., D∗T and F (D
∗
T ) become larger), EECT decreases because
20In other words, (i) q is multiplied in (a) and (a′), (ii) G(x¯∗|1)L appears in (b′) and G(x¯∗|0) · 0 in (a′),
and (1−G(x¯∗|0)) in (a′) is smaller than (1−G(x¯∗|1)) in (b′).
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(a′) < (b′). Therefore, the deterrence effect is unambiguous, and it always operates to reduce
the expected error costs.
Although the total effect of Twiqbal is ambiguous, a useful sufficient-condition can be easily
derived. As the deterrence effect operates to reduce expected error costs, if the dismissal effect
has the same effect, expected error costs unambiguously decrease under Twiqbal. This can be
done by fixing the levels of deterrence at DC in EECC and EECT and deriving the following
condition from the comparison between the two error costs:
G(x¯∗|1)
G(x¯∗|0) <
F (DC)qe
(1− F (DC))(1− e) (12)
which again imposes a constraint on the ratio between the dismissal rates under each act.
Proposition 4. If the dismissal ratio is sufficiently small, expected error costs decrease after
Twiqbal.
On one hand, observe that the condition above is not binding if F (DC) ≈ 1 because, in
that case, the right-hand side is larger than 1 whereas the left-hand side is smaller than 1.
Thus, if the level of deterrence is already high under Conley, the dismissal of non-negligent
injurers (the (a′) part) becomes the dominant factor in the dismissal effect and expected error
costs decrease accordingly after Twiqbal. On the other hand, if the level of deterrence is very
low under Conley, it imposes a stringent constraint on the dismissal ratio so that the judge
needs to dismiss non-negligent injurers’ cases sufficiently often in equilibrium under Twiqbal.
Thus, if both (11) and (12) are satisfied, Twiqbal simultaneously raises deterrence and reduces
expected litigation costs and expected error costs, thus contributing to higher social welfare.
4 Concluding Remarks
The Supreme Court’s important decisions, known as Twiqbal, have triggered a plethora of
research on their effects on litigation outcomes in the United States, mostly focusing on
litigation costs. Thus, the effect of those decisions on the injurer’s primary behavior has been
largely neglected in literature, which could pose a problem because the effect on deterrence
is crucial in understanding the ruling’s effect on various litigation outcomes. To this end,
within a stylized game-theoretic model, this paper investigates the ways in which the Court’s
ruling might influence the level of deterrence as well as other important litigation outcomes.
I demonstrate that the ruling could bring about desirable changes in terms of deterrence,
expected litigation costs, and expected error costs as long as the dismissal ratio is sufficiently
small, which depends on the correlation structure between the injurer’s primary behavior and
the strength of the case filed at trial courts.
An interesting avenue for future research is to study the ruling’s effect on the rate of
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frivolous lawsuits.21 A frivolous lawsuit is a case in which an injurer is brought to the court
without incurring harm. The number of frivolous lawsuits under each legal regime is
Game-C : F (DC)(1− q)sC
Game-T : F (D∗T )(1− q)sT
where si for i ∈ {C, T} is the probability that an injurer is brought to the court without
incurring harm under each legal regime. Although I assume si = 0 in the basic model,
it could be positive in a general setting. If the number of non-negligent injurers increases
under Twiqbal, it, in turn, raises the base for potentially frivolous lawsuits. Thus, if si does
not change across the two legal regimes, frivolous lawsuits will occur more frequently under
Twiqbal, which is a result contrary to Campos et al. (2015).
In reality, si may differ across legal regimes. Suppose a victim must incur a certain
amount of cost to bring an injurer to the court. Under Twiqbal, the judge could dismiss the
case; therefore, the victim expects to waste the cost for nothing with a high probability. As
the judge’s gate-keeping power reduces the net value of bringing a frivolous lawsuit, the victim
may bring such a suit less often, i.e., sC > sT . However, although we have sC > sT , it does
not guarantee that we can reduce these wasteful lawsuits under Twiqbal, because the base for
these suits may increase due to higher deterrence. Thus, whether the judge’s gate-keeping
power can eliminate frivolous lawsuits crucially depends on these countervailing forces.
This discussion suggests that to evaluate a legal change’s effect on frivolous suits, it is
important to assess its effect on deterrence. The Supreme Court reasoned that Twiqbal could
eliminate such suits by having judges screen meritless claims; however, this reasoning could be
partial. As the model suggests, if the judge’s gate-keeping power raises the level of deterrence,
it operates to raise frivolous suits by raising the base for such lawsuits. Future research is
needed to shed more light on this complex interplay between deterrence and frivolous lawsuits.
5 Appendix
5.1 Degenerate Beliefs Case
Let µ denote the judge’s belief about the fraction of non-negligent injurers in the population.
In the following, I show that degenerate beliefs held by the judge (i.e., µ ∈ {0, 1}) cannot
constitute an equilibrium.
21Scholars have suggested various ways to fight frivolous lawsuits. Kozel and Rosenberg (2004) argue for
mandating motions for summary judgment. Rosenberg and Shavell (2006) suggest an option to bar settlement
as a solution to eliminate frivolous suits, but Sichelman (2008) argue that the option to bar settlement may
reduce social welfare by inducing defendants to exercise the option in meritorious suits. Stone and Miceli
(2013) study the ways in which the existence of frivolous suits affects the defendant’s primary behavior.
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Suppose µ = 0, which implies that the judge believes that all injurers were negligent.
Then, I have
E[θδ|x, accident] = P (a = 1|x, accident)θL
=
(1− µ)g(x|1)
(1− µ)g(x|1) + µg(x|0)q × θL
=
g(x|1)
g(x|1) × θL
= θL
> c+ θeL
where the last inequality holds by Assumption 3. Therefore, in Pleading Stage, the judge
sends all cases to trial for all x ∈ R.
Anticipating this, in Precaution Stage, the injurer knows that his expected payoff is given
by
a = 0⇒ EpiI = −q(eL+ cI)
a = 1⇒ EpiI = b− (1− e)L− cI
Thus, the injurer chooses a = 1 if and only if
(1− (1 + q)e)L+ (1− q)cI < b (13)
where the left-hand side of the inequality is greater than 0. Thus, those low-type injurers
with b ≈ 0 are deterred, which is not consistent with the judge’s belief of µ = 0. Therefore,
µ = 0 cannot constitute an equilibrium.
If µ = 1, it can be similarly shown that it cannot constitute an equilibrium. This completes
the proof.
5.2 Proof for Lemma 1
Let µ ≡ F (DT ) ∈ (0, 1) be the judge’s belief about the portion of non-negligent injurers where
DT is the level of deterrence. Then, I have
E[θδ|x, accident] = P (a = 1|x, accident)θL
=
(1− µ)g(x|1)
(1− µ)g(x|1) + µg(x|0)q × θL
=
[
1 +
µg(x|0)q
(1− µ)g(x|1)
]−1
× θL
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=[
1 +
µq
(1− µ)φ(x)
]−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ψ(x)
×θL
= ψ(x)θL.
Thus, the judge dismisses the case if and only if
ψ(x)θL ≤ c+ θeL ⇐⇒ ψ(x) ≤ c+ θeL
θL︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡K
where K < 1 by Assumption 3. By Assumptions 1 and 2, ψ(x) is strictly increasing in x and
I have
lim
x→−∞ψ(x) = 0 and limx→∞ψ(x) = 1.
Thus, there exists a unique cutoff x¯ such that
ψ(x) < K ∀x < x¯
ψ(x¯) = K
ψ(x) > K ∀x > x¯
which also shows that |x¯| <∞. Therefore, the judge dismisses the case if and only if x ≤ x¯.
To prove the second part, observe that K is strictly increasing in c and e, and strictly
decreasing in θ and L. Because x¯ is determined from the equation ψ(x¯) = K and ψ(x) is
strictly increasing in x, it is straightforward to see that x¯ is strictly increasing in c and e, and
strictly decreasing in θ and L. Finally, if q increases, the ψ(x) function shifts down. Thus,
with K fixed, the value of x¯ for ψ(x¯) = K increases. This completes the proof.
5.3 Proof for Proposition 1
To prove the existence, it is sufficient to show that there exists a solution x¯∗ to the following
equation:
θL
1 +
(
µ∗q
(1− µ∗)φ(x¯∗)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
= c+ θeL (14)
where
µ∗ = F [(1−G(x¯∗|1))(cI + (1− e)L)− q(1−G(x¯∗|0))(cI + eL)].
As x¯∗ → −∞, I have
µ∗ → F (cI + (1− e)L− q(cI + eL))
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which is a number strictly between 0 and 1. This is because
cI + (1− e)L− q(cI + eL) = (1− (1 + q)e)L+ (1− q)cI < b¯
due to Assumption 4, and
cI + (1− e)L− q(cI + eL) = (1− e)L− qeL+ (1− q)cI > (1− q)cI > 0
due to q ∈ (0, 1) and e ∈ (0, 1/2). Thus, as x¯∗ → −∞, I have (A)→∞ because µ∗ converges
to a number strictly between 0 and 1 and φ(x¯∗) converges to 0, and therefore the left-hand
side of (14) converges to 0, which is smaller than the right hand side of (14). As x¯∗ → ∞,
I have µ∗ → F (0) = 0. Thus, as x¯∗ → ∞, I have (A) → 0, and therefore the left-hand side
of (14) converges to θL, which is larger than the right-hand side of (14) by Assumption 3.
Thus, there exists a solution x¯∗ to (14) where |x¯∗| <∞. As it is routine to show D∗T ∈ (0, b¯),
this completes the proof.
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